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I. INTRODUCTION
James Madison once said, "a popular Government, without
popular information, or a means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."1 For almost
1. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 723 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting James
Madison, to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910)).
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forty years, the Supreme Court has anchored the press's and public's
right of access to government proceedings and information in the
language of the First Amendment. 2 Grounding the right of access in
the language of the First Amendment is unsatisfactory not only
because it goes beyond the scope of traditional First Amendment
values, but also because it does not provide access to the amount of
information necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our
democratic government. A more intellectually honest, and ultimately
more persuasive, conception of the right of access would recognize it as
a systemic right, similar to the right to vote, that is both inherent in
and essential to a republican system of self-government. Since an
informed electorate is essential to the proper functioning of a
democracy, access should be protected to the same extent as other
systemic rights.3 Furthermore, courts have recognized that access
serves several important functions in a democracy. Access acts as a
check on the government, ensures that government does its job
properly, enhances the perception of integrity and fairness in
government proceedings, and most importantly ensures that the
"individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our
republican system of self-government."4 These functions demonstrate
the importance of protecting the right of access and the "openness"
that it creates, but treating access as a speech right that is protected
by the First Amendment fails to recognize that the right of access is
more fundamental, that it is part of the foundation upon which the
First Amendment is built.
Part II of this Note explores the Supreme Court's historical
definition of the right of access in First Amendment terms. Part III
argues that the Court's traditional definition is unsatisfactory because
it is inconsistent with other First Amendment doctrine.
Consequently, the traditional definition does little to secure the ability
of the press and the public to access government-held information.
Part IV proposes an approach under which the right of access is
recognized as a systemic right that is inherent in, and essential to, our
established constitutional structure. Parts V and VI examine more
recent language in Supreme Court opinions and in several "right to
2. See infra Part II and accompanying footnotes. The First Amendment reads, "Congress
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for the redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. A systemic right is a right that is inherit in our constitutional structure. In addition to
the right of access and the right to vote, the constitutional protections for criminal defendants
could also be considered systemic rights.
4. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
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know" statutes suggesting that the right of access is a systemic right.
Finally, Part VII considers some modern restrictions on the right of
access following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and
suggests that these restrictions should be tailored to address the
importance of the right of access in a democracy.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
The Supreme Court first considered the right of access not in
the context of the constitutional protection of the press and the
newsgathering process, but rather in terms of citizens' general right to
access information regarding the functioning of the national
government. For example, in Zemel v. Rusk, the petitioner raised a
First Amendment challenge to the Secretary of State's refusal to
validate his passport for travel to Cuba claiming the "travel ban is a
direct interference with the First Amendment rights of citizens to
travel abroad so that they might acquaint themselves at first hand
with the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign and
domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect such
policies." 5  While the Court acknowledged that the travel ban
restricted the free flow of information, it rejected the argument that
citizens have a constitutional right of access emphasizing that "[tihere
are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow.... The right to speak
and publish does not carry with it an unrestrained right to gather
information."6 The Supreme Court's early reluctance to accept the
argument that First Amendment freedom of speech granted citizens
an unrestricted right to gather information foreshadowed the Court's
later skepticism of the press's claim for constitutional protection of the
newsgathering process.7
In the cases following Zemel, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected both the argument that the press enjoyed special privileges
not enjoyed by average citizens and the argument that the press had a
constitutionally mandated right of access. In the first of these cases,
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court considered whether requiring reporters
to reveal their sources before state or federal grand juries violated the
5. 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (internal quotations omitted).
6. Id. at 16-17. The Court elaborated that "[l]or example, the prohibition of unauthorized
entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to gather information he might
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry
into the White House a First Amendment right." Id. at 17.
7. See Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse" The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 248 (1995).
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First Amendment.8 Although the Court admitted that, "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of press could be
eviscerated,"9 it reaffirmed the idea that "the First Amendment does
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally."10 In holding that
reporters do not have a First Amendment privilege that protects them
from being required to reveal their sources in a grand jury
investigation, the Court discredited the idea that the press had a
special constitutional right to gather information from confidential
sources without governmental interference."
Two years later the Court began to define more precisely the
scope of the right of access in a series of cases that asked whether the
press has a First Amendment right of access to prison facilities
generally closed to the public. 12 In Pell v. Procunier, the reporter-
plaintiffs were denied permission to interview several prison inmates
because of a section of the California Department of Corrections
Manual that prohibited such press interviews. 13  The reporters
challenged the constitutionality of the rule, asserting that it
impermissibly interfered with their right to gather information under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 4 The Supreme Court refused
to grant the press a special constitutional right of access and held that
because the rule did not "deny the press access to sources of
information available to members of the general public"1 5 there was no
First or Fourteenth Amendment violation. The Court reaffirmed this
holding in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., which it described as
"constitutionally indistinguishable" 16 from Pell, and again in Houchins
v. KQED, Inc. In Houchins, the Court concluded that there was "no
discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose or for standards
governing disclosure of or access to information .... Neither the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of
access to government information."1 7
Although these cases seemed to foreclose any argument
supporting the idea that the media had a constitutional right of access
8. 408 U.S. 665, 665 (1972).
9. Id. at 681.
10. Id. at 684.
11. See Cerruti, supra note 7, at 249.
12. See id. at 250.
13. 417 U.S. 817, 819-20 (1974).
14. Id. at 821.
15. Id. at 835.
16. 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
17. 438 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1977).
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to information, the Supreme Court was forced to reconsider the
constitutional implications of interfering with the press's access to
government information when lower courts began barring the press
from courtroom proceedings in criminal cases. Although the Court
had previously rejected the argument that the press or the public had
a constitutional right of access to pretrial hearings,", in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia the petitioners challenged a closure order
barring reporters from the courtroom during a criminal trial. 19 The
Supreme Court began its analysis by emphasizing the unique question
presented by this case. Unlike prior cases where the Court had
assessed closure orders in terms of the competing interests of freedom
of the press and the defendant's right to a fair trial,20 in this case the
Court focused on whether the right of the press and public to attend
criminal trials was guaranteed by the Constitution.21 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Burger began his analysis by emphasizing that
throughout history criminal trials have always been presumptively
open to "all who care to observe."22 He went on to say that "[tihe right
of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials
have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press .... " 23
It was Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, however, that set
forth the dual considerations that would play a vital role in future
right of access cases. According to Justice Brennan, the two factors
courts must examine when deciding whether a right of access exists
are: (1) whether the particular proceeding has historically been open
to the public, and (2) whether that openness plays a positive role in
the proceeding. 24 In terms of the openness inquiry, Justice Brennan
discussed the established tradition of open trials in the United States
and the Court's own understanding that '[a] trial is a public event."' 25
Justice Brennan further argued that public access to trials "serves to
advance several of the particular purposes of the trial,"26 and "acts as
an important check. .. [because] the knowledge that every criminal
18. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
19. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
20. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 383 U.S.
333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
21. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
22. Id. at 564.
23. Id. at 577.
24. See id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
26. Id. at 593. Justice Brennan further elaborated that public trials "assure the criminal
defendant a fair and accurate adjudication of guilt or innocence" and aid in accurate factfinding.
Id. at 593, 596.
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trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power."27
Although seven of the eight Justices who participated in the case
wrote separate opinions, all seven of those Justices agreed that the
First Amendment gives the press and public an affirmative right of
access to criminal trials. 28
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court
clarified the rule established in Richmond Newspapers. At issue in
Globe was a Massachusetts Statute that barred the press and public
from the courtroom during trials involving sexual offenses with
victims under the age of eighteen. 29 Just as in Richmond Newspapers,
a newspaper denied access to the courtroom challenged the law as
violation of the First Amendment. 30 Although the Court applied the
dual considerations of Richmond Newspapers to find a First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials, it cautioned that even
though "the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional
stature, it is not absolute."31 The Court then added elements of the
strict scrutiny standard to the right of access inquiry when it
concluded that press and public can only be barred from attending
criminal trails under limited circumstances, and that "the State's
justification in denying access must be a weighty one.... [I]t must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
27. Id.. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
28. See Cerruti, supra note 7, at 272-73. Justice Burger's plurality opinion expressly left
open the question of whether there is a corresponding First Amendment right of access to civil
trials. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17 (saying "Whether the public has a right to
attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both
civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open."). On the other hand, Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion recognized that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press
and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 599
(Stewart, J., concurring). This is a question that the Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to
answer.
29. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). The Massachusetts statute provided in relevant part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime
involving sex. where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or
against when the crime is alleged to have been committed, . .. the presiding justice
shall exclude the general public from the court room, admitting only such persons as
may have a direct interest in the case.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
30. Globe, 457 U.S. at 600-01.
31. Id. at 606. The Richmond Newspapers plurality also warned that "our holding today
does not means that the First Amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press
are absolute. Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions ... so may a trial judge, in the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable




interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. '32 In the end,
the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because, even
though Massachusetts had a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors who were of victims of
sexual offenses, that interest did not justify the mandatory closure of
the courtroom in all such cases.33
After Globe the press's right of access to criminal trials was
firmly established, but it was still unclear whether that right extended
to other judicial proceedings. Two years after the Supreme Court
decided Globe, the Court considered whether the press has a right of
access to voir dire proceedings in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court (Press-Enterprise 1).34 In Press-Enterprise I, the Court for the
first time used the dual considerations of Richmond Newspapers and
Globe to assess the press's right of access to proceedings other than
criminal trials. The Court again emphasized that jury selection had
historically been open to the public and that this openness "plays an
important role in the administration of justice"35 because "people not
actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of
fairness are being preserved .... "36 The Court then turned to the
compelling interest test set forth in Globe to determine whether the
government had asserted a sufficiently compelling interest to rebut
the presumption of openness.37 While the court noted that "[t]he jury
selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling
interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply
personal matters the person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of
the public domain,"38 the trial judge in this case failed to explain with
sufficient specificity the privacy concerns that justified a six week
closure of the voir dire proceedings and his refusal to release any
portion of the transcripts of the proceedings even though he admitted
that "most of the information [contained in the transcripts was] dull
and boring."39 Any potential privacy concerns could be managed by
32. Globe, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
33. See id. at 610-11. Yet the Court emphasized that
A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to
protect the welfare of a minor victim .... Such an approach ensures that the
constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to criminal trials will not be
restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest.
Id. at 608-09.
34. 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984).
35. Id. at 508.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 510.
38. Id. at 511.
39. Id. at 513.
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sealing only those portions of the transcript that warranted
anonymity. 40 Accordingly, the Court held that the government had
failed to demonstrate that the denial of access was necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.41
While the Press Enterprise I Court discussed the Richmond
Newspapers considerations, it did not expressly hold that the two
factors considered in those cases were prerequisites to the right of
access to voir dire proceedings. 42 Therefore, after Press-Enterprise I
there was some uncertainty as to the appropriate standard for
determining whether or not a right of access exists. 43 For example, in
Waller v. Georgia the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial to close pretrial
suppression hearings to the press and public, but the Court did not
even mention the Richmond Newspaper considerations, focusing
instead on "the importance of the public interest in such hearings."44
Finally, two years after deciding Press-Enterprise I, the
Supreme Court definitively addressed the press's right of access for
the last time in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I1).45 In Press-Enterprise II, the press and public were
excluded from the forty-one day preliminary hearing in the case of a
nurse charged with murdering twelve of his patients.46 At the
conclusion of the hearing the judge refused to release the transcript of
the proceeding because there was a "reasonable likelihood that release
of all or any part of the transcripts might prejudice [the] defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial."47
The Supreme Court once again redefined the Richmond
Newspapers standard for determining whether or not there is a right
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 505-10 (discussing both the historical roots and the public benefits of allowing
jury selection to be open to the public); see also Michael J. Hayes, What Ever Happened to "The
Right to Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information since Richmond Newspapers, 73
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (1987) ("[T]he opinion did not explicitly state that these two factors were
prerequisites to a right of access. Indeed, evidence of historical tradition was referred to merely
as 'helpful' to that determination." (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505)).
43. Hayes, supra note 42, at 1119.
44. 467 U.S. 39, 47-49 (1984); see Hayes, supra note 42, at 1119-20.
45. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
46. Id. at 3-4. The press and public were excluded under a California statute that allowed
such proceedings to be closed if "exclusion of the public is necessary in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 4 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West
1985)).
47. Id. at 5 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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to government controlled information. 4 The Court framed the dual
considerations set forth by Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers
as "considerations of experience and logic" 49 and established that a
"qualified" right of access attaches to a particular proceeding if it
"passes these tests of experience and logic." 50 This right is qualified
because it can be overcome if the government can withstand the strict
scrutiny standard of Globe.51 In Press Enterprise II, the Court applied
this standard to hold that the right of access applies to preliminary
hearings. Accordingly, the government has to demonstrate that
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest."52 Since the lower court failed to consider less
burdensome alternatives than complete closure, and because the
"reasonable likelihood" standard used by the lower court "failed to
consider the First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings,"
the Supreme Court held the closure was unconstitutional. 53
III. WHY THERE IS No ROOM IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR A RIGHT
OF ACCESS.
As these cases illustrate, the First Amendment has been
instrumental in the Supreme Court's fashioning of an affirmative
right of access to governmental proceedings and information. 54 The
First Amendment, however, is an unsatisfactory basis for the right of
access because there is no textual reference to the right of access in
the First Amendment. Courts should not expand the textual meaning
of the First Amendment beyond the scope of traditional First
Amendment values to encompass an institutional privilege for the
press.
48. See Hayes, supra note 42, at 1120.
49. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.
50. Id.
51. Id. Namely the compelling interest test.
52. Id. at 13-14. The Court further specified that
If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trail, the preliminary
hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that, first,
there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable
alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights.
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 15.
54. In particular, the parts of the First Amendment relating to speech and the press are
most relevant to the right of access. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging freedom of speech, or of the press ...."); see supra Part II and accompanying notes.
2004] 1357
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A. The Speech Clause: A Verbal Misfit
Nowhere in the language of the First Amendment is the right
of access specifically mentioned. Furthermore, the ability of the press
to access government information and proceedings is inconsistent with
the types of speech historically protected by the First Amendment.
The general ability of the press to attend government proceedings and
access government documents constitutes behavior, not speech, and
behavior as such traditionally has not been included in our notions of
free expression.
Moreover, it can be argued that the Constitution, and more
specifically the Bill of Rights, does not contain any affirmative rights.
There are two basic types of provisions found in the United States
Constitution: (1) those that distribute governmental power among
federal and state government and among the different branches of the
federal government and (2) those that place restrictions on the
exercise of those delegations of power which are designed to protect
individuals from government excess. 55 With respect to the first type of
provision, the Framers envisioned the Constitution as acting so it
granted powers, most of which are found in the body of the
Constitution and deal with relationships between governmental
units. 56 With respect to the second type of provision, the Framers
envisioned the people as not wanting the government to act against
them, so restrictions were placed on government actions. These
restrictions are primarily found in the Bill of Rights and deal with the
relationships between governmental units and individuals. 57 Since
the Framers drafted the language of the Bill of Rights to place
restrictions on government action, it follows that the Framers did not
intend the First Amendment to function as a grant of an affirmative
right of access. More specifically, the language of the First
Amendment secures the "freedom ... of the press" from any "law
abridging" it, which suggests that the purpose of the First Amendment
55. I am grateful to Professor Thomas McCoy, Vanderbilt University Law School, for his
explanation of the history and structure of the Constitution, some of which is described in the
text accompanying this footnote.
56. For example, Article I Section 8, among others, enumerates certain powers granted to
Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Also, Article II, Section 2, among others, enumerates powers
granted to the President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
57. For example, the Fourth Amendment says that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Likewise, the First Amendment says
that the "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). In terms of "rights" these
restrictions could be viewed as a right to be free of the governmental activity that the restriction
prohibits.
1358 [Vol. 57:4:1349
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was to protect against "coercive government interference [with speech]
rather than to require the government to conduct its business
openly."58  Under this interpretation, the language of the First
Amendment is "technically ill-designed" to impose on the government
an obligation to conduct its affairs in the open and accordingly to
grant the press an affirmative right of access. 59
In addition to the fact that the First Amendment does not
explicitly mention an affirmative right of access, historical evidence
suggests that the Framers of the Constitution were not concerned
with implicitly assuring the press access through the First
Amendment.60 In fact, not only was the press excluded from the
constitutional convention, the delegates were forbidden from even
discussing the proceedings with reporters. 61 The Framers considered
the secrecy of the proceedings to be necessary for ratification of the
Constitution. 62 Additionally, the press had limited access to the
debates regarding the Bill of Rights because only the debates in the
House were open to the public. 63 The Senate, which actually drafted
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The
Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 500 (1980) (noting that the First
Amendment "seems to secure citizens against coercive governmental interference rather than to
require the government to conduct its business openly").
59. BeVier, supra note 58, at 500 (describing the First Amendment as "technically ill-
designed to impose upon government the affirmative obligation to disclose its affairs which must
be the correlative of a 'right to know"); see David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the
Public's "Right to Know", 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 582 (1980) (stating that "[T]he First
Amendment imposes no requirement that the government act affirmatively either to inform
citizens of or to grant them special access to policy.making institutions and processes. In other
words, the First Amendment, as judicially construed, guarantees individuals' freedom from
restraints on their communications, but not the liberty to demand and obtain information from
governmental and non-governmental sources.").
60. Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 927, 933 (1992) ( "[H]istory does not, of course, establish that the framers were concerned
with assuring press access. Indeed, it is unlikely that the framers had any such specific
purpose."). However, at the Virginia ratification convention Patrick Henry emphasized the
importance of openness, arguing that "[Congress] may carry on the most wicked and pernicious
schemes under the dark veil of secrecy. The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be,
secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them." North Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 169-70 (J.
Elliot ed., 1881)).
61. Dyk, supra note 60, at 500; Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy-Pattern of Deception:
What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right to Know, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 51, 58-59
(2002).
62. Alexander Hamilton said if the ratification debates had been open, "the clamours of
faction would have prevented any satisfactory result .... Propositions, made without due
reflection, would have been handles for a profusion of ill-natured accusation." Halstuk, supra
note 61, at 59 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Reply to Anonymous Charges, in 3 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 368 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)).
63. Id.
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the final language of the First Amendment, kept its proceedings
secret. 64 Finally, five different versions of the First Amendment were
considered by Congress and the final language was the result of a
compromise between the House and Senate. 65 Considering the careful
attention paid to the drafting of constitutional language, if the
Framers had intended to include a right of access as a component of
the First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press, they would
have done so explicitly. 66
B. The Press Clause: Is the Press the Only Organized Private Business
Given Explicit Constitutional Protection?
Many of the arguments advanced by the media for more
inclusive rights of access and greater freedom to gather information
are grounded in the press clause of the First Amendment. 67 Increased
government secrecy in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, has made the media even more eager to argue that the First
Amendment was intended to ensure total freedom of the press by
allowing unrestricted access to all governmental proceedings. 68 The
media, however, may be giving the press clause far more
constitutional significance than it deserves. The legislative history
surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment shows that the
phrase "freedom of the press" was meant to ensure that people were
free to express their views through the use of the printing press, as
well as through the spoken word.69  For example, the 1776
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights suggested, "[t]hat the people have
64. Id. The Senate continued to meet behind closed doors until 1794 as did the House until
after the War of 1812. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 209-10. Furthermore, the doors
were only open to floor debate and committee sessions were not open to the public until the mid-
1970s. Id..
65. According to David Anderson there was the version that James Madison introduced, a
version by a House select committee, the Senate's initial revision of the House language, a
second Senate version created by a floor amendment, and the final version produced by a
conference committee. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV.
455, 476 n.126 (1983).
66. The expressio unius est exlusio alterius canon of construction holds that to express or
include one thing implies the exclusion of the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 602 (7th ed.
1999).
67. See Anderson, supra note 65, at 456 ("In the last decade... the press has begun to
assert rights arising specifically from the press clause - the right to maintain the confidentiality
of sources, the right of access to prisons and courtrooms, the right to keep police from searching
newsrooms, and the right to prevent libel plaintiffs from inquiring into journalists' thought
processes."). The "press clause" of the First Amendment refers to the language "Congress shall
make no law... abridging .... freedom of... the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. See Detroit Free Press Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
69. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446 n.90 (2002).
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a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their
sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be
restrained."70 In this sense, the press clause of the First Amendment
was not designed to grant the press special institutional privileges,
but simply to guarantee freedom of expression in both oral and
written form.
Likewise, First Amendment historian Leonard Levy has
argued that the freedom of the press simply means freedom from
restraints on the press prior to publication. 71 Levy focused on the
phrase "Congress shall make no law. .. ,"72 asserting that the press
clause was "intended to prohibit any Congressional regulation of the
press .... The Framers meant Congress to be totally without power to
enact legislation respecting the press. '73  He argued that the
motivation for the special protection of the press, that is the protection
against Congressional legislation, stems from the "special
relationship" between the press and popular government. 74 Levy
maintained that this type of press protection was essential to ensure
an informed electorate in our democratic system and that "[t]he
electoral process would have been a sham if voters did not have the
assistance of the press in learning what the candidates stood for and
what their records showed about past performance and
qualifications."75 Levy further emphasized the crucial role the press
plays as the so-called Fourth Estate, 76 acting as an informal check on
70. 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 266 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971),
quoted in Anderson, supra note 69, at 446 n.90. The initial language proposed by James
Madison for the First Amendment said that "[tihe people shall not be deprived or abridged of
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one
of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." Anderson, supra note 69, at 446 n.90
(quoting James Madison, Fourth Proposal to the House (1789), in 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 451 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds., 1834)). Professor
Anderson explains that:
Although Madison's language could be read as recognizing a meaning of freedom of
the press distinct from the people's right to publish their sentiments, nothing in the
debates of the First Congress or the ratifying convention suggests that either this
language or the final language of the First Amendment was so intended.
Id.
71. Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON
lv (L. Levy ed., 1966), noted in Anderson, supra note 65, at 495.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. I
73. Levy, supra note 71, at lvi-lvii, quoted in Anderson, supra note 65, at 496.
74. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 213 (1988)
[hereinafter LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT], quoted in Halstuk, supra note 61, at 57; see LEONARD W.
LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 291 (1985), noted in Halstuk, supra note 61, at 57.
75. LEvy, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 74, at 213, quoted in Halstuk, supra note 61, at 57.
76. This term was first used by Thomas Carlyle to describe the British Government saying,
"Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there
sat a Fourth Estate more important than they all. It is not a figure of speech or a witty saying; it
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government by "expos[ing] public mismanagement and keep[ing]
power fragmented, manageable, and accountable."77 These arguments
indicate that the purpose of the press clause was to guard against
prior restraints of the press and to place additional checks on
government power, not to necessarily secure a First Amendment right
of access. 78
Other constitutional scholars argue that the press clause of the
First Amendment not only protects the ability of the press to speak,
but also protects certain types of press behavior. 79 The argument that
the First Amendment protects press behavior stems from the
observation that "[tihere are many actions that are understood... as
functions of the press that might never blossom into publication, yet
they clearly serve First Amendment interests.... The press is the
press because it does something, not necessarily because it says
something."80 In this respect, the press is a "political citizen" whose
function is to scrutinize and report on the actions of the government.8'
Therefore, the argument goes, the First Amendment protects press
behavior because the press acts as a "politically engaged citizen
intending to communicate information" and such political "speech" is
the core of First Amendment protection. 82 It has likewise been argued
that the First Amendment protects "not the institution, but the role of
the press: To afford a vehicle of information and opinion, to inform and
educate the public ... and to act as a surrogate to obtain for readers
is a literal fact - very momentous to us in these times." Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (excerpted from an address on November 2, 1974, at the Yale Law
School Sesquicentennial Convocation, New Haven, Connecticut). Id.
77. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 74, at 213, noted in Halstuk, supra note 61, at 57.
Another scholar has commented that the press was established as the Fourth Estate because:
The Press was to play a crucial role in the embryonic government - it was to serve as
investigator and reporter of government actions so that an informed citizenry could be
actively involved in a participatory democracy. The Framers ensured that the
workings of the government, and society at large, would continuously be made
available to the People; and that the thoughts, ideas, and opinions of the common man
would, conversely be made known to public officials.
Christopher G. Blood, Note, The Eroded Power of the Press and the Need to Apply Separation of
Powers Principles, 15 J.L. & POL. 781, 786-87 (1999).
78. The term "prior restraint" basically refers to government restrictions on speech prior to
its publication. Levy may have based his argument on the ideas of Blackstone who has
commented that "[t]he liberty of the press [consists] in laying no previous restraints on
publication...." KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 957 (14th
ed. 2001) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIESat 151-52).
79. See Jon Paul Dilts, The Press Clause and Press Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of
Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & POLY 25, 31 (2002).
80. Id. (giving examples of press actions that do not involve publication, including
unpublished interviews, undercover investigations, and attendance of government meetings).
81. See id. at 33.
82. Id. at 34.
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news and information that [citizens] could not or would not gather on
their own."8 3  This line of reasoning would seem to support the
argument that there is a First Amendment right of access; however,
the idea that the press clause protects nonexpressive press behavior
like newsgathering is inconsistent with traditional First Amendment
principles under which the First Amendment only protects actual
expression and expressive conduct.8 4
Certain members of the Supreme Court have been outspoken
in arguing that the Framers intended to grant the press special
privileges, but even these Justices have stopped short of recognizing a
special right of access guaranteed by the First Amendment. For
example, in an address delivered at Yale Law School in 1974, Justice
Potter Stewart argued that "[i]f the Free Press guarantee meant no
more than freedom of expression, it would be a constitutional
redundancy .... By including both guarantees in the First
Amendment, the Founders quite clearly recognized the distinction
between the two."8 5  Justice Stewart further suggested that, "[t]he
primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was...
to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional
check on the three official branches."86 Therefore, "[t]he publishing
business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given
explicit constitutional protection."87 He later asserted: "That the First
Amendment speaks separately of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press is no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the
critical role played by the press in American society."88 Nonetheless,
even though Justice Stewart believed the First Amendment granted
the press institutional privileges above those enjoyed by ordinary
citizens, he did not think that the First Amendment granted the press
a special right of access to government information.8 9
83. Robert Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for the
Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 633 (1979). This idea contradicts Justice Stewart's
theory of an institutional privilege for the press granted by the First Amendment. See supra
notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
84. For example, symbolic speech such a burning a draft card to protest a war.
85. Stewart, supra note 76, at 633-34.
86. Id. at 634.
87. Id. at 633.
88. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Stewart, supra note 76, at 636. Justice Stewart noted that
[T]he autonomous press may publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it
can.
*.. The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But
the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed.
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information,
or to require openness from the bureaucracy ....
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Nonetheless, even if the First Amendment can be read as
granting the press special institutional privileges above those enjoyed
by ordinary citizens, it does not necessarily follow that the First
Amendment grants the press a right of access. One reason why the
right of access falls outside the ambit of First Amendment protection
is that there are significant distinctions between the interests
protected by the right of access and the rights protected under
traditional First Amendment doctrine. 90 If the press clause of the
First Amendment is designed to act primarily as a check on the ability
of the government to restrain or punish publication, then the
government's failure to allow access to certain types of information
threatens different values than the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment. 91 On the one hand, the freedom of the press to publish
information regarding the activities of the government is at the core of
First Amendment protection.92 A necessary corollary of the freedom of
the press to publish information regarding government activities is
the freedom of the press to gather the information it seeks to publish
about those activities. 93 Therefore since it would be a violation of the
First Amendment for the government to place restrictions on the
publication of the information, it would also violate the First
Amendment for the government to restrain or punish the process of
gathering the information in the first place. 94 On the other hand, even
if it would violate the First Amendment for the government to restrain
or punish the press's ability to gather information, there is no
antecedent First Amendment violation when the government merely
denies the press access to the information because when the
government denies the press access to the information it possesses "it
The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution.
Id. Justice Stewart echoed these sentiments in his concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers
cases. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring);
see also Ethel S. White, The Protection of the Individual and the Free Exchange of Ideas: Justice
Potter Stewart's Role in First and Fourth Amendment Cases, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 87, 96 (1985).
90. BeVier, supra note 58, at 498.
91. Id. Constitutional scholar Leonard Levy argued that the freedom of the press simply
means freedom from restraints on the press prior to publication. See supra notes 71-78 and
accompanying text.
92. BeVier, supra note 58, at 498.
93. Id.
94. Id. In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court recognized that government prior
restraint of the press violated the First Amendment, saying, "it is the chief purpose of the [free
press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)
However, the Court further recognized that prior restraints on publication would not violate the
First Amendment in certain situations; for example when the speech is obscene or involved the
publication of military secrets in times of war. Id. at 716.
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neither directly restrains nor imposes punishment on the information-
gathering process." 95
On the other hand, the effect of the denial of access is arguably
similar to prior restraint in that both actions would restrict the press's
right of access and the free flow of information. Nonetheless, "failure
of the government to take affirmative action to remove the
impediment caused by denial of access cannot credibly be argued to be
the constitutional equivalent of punishment or censorship."96
Furthermore, prior restraint of publication has a different effect on
the publisher than does the denial of access because prior restraint
directly interferes with the publisher's freedom to publish while there
is no such interference when all that is denied is access to the
information. 97 If access is denied the publisher is still free to publish
the fact that the government denied access, as well as any other
information that the publisher is able to acquire from other sources. 98
Finally, prior restraint and government censorship of speech implicate
different values than does the government's denial of access to
information because "censorship directly undermine[s] the value of
free speech, while the denial of access to information undermines the
value of well-informed speech."99 The availability of less information
may result in less informed speech, but it will not make that speech
any less "free" because the government's denial of access to certain
information does not restrain the press from publishing information
that it already has or that it can otherwise obtain.100 Accordingly,
since denying the press access to information cannot be considered
prior restraint, and because ensuring that the government does not
impose restraints on the press's publication of information prior to its
actual publication is one of the core values underlying the First
Amendment, the right of access implicates different values that those
underlying the First Amendment. Therefore grounding the right of
access in the First Amendment is unsatisfactory.
Another reason that the First Amendment is an unsatisfactory
basis for the right of access is that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the press clause of the First Amendment does not grant
rights to the press above and beyond those granted to ordinary
95. BeVier, supra note 58, at 498.
96. Id.
97. Id.





citizens.101 For example, in his concurring opinion in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Chief Justice Burger argued that the press
was not entitled to special First Amendment protection noting, "the
history of the Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a
'special' or 'institutional' privilege [for the press]. ' ' 102 In the same
opinion, Chief Justice Burger also argued that the "Speech Clause
standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express
ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses specifically on the
liberty to disseminate expression broadly. . . ."03 Likewise, in
Branzburg v. Hayes Justice White cautioned that the "First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of
special access to information not available to the public generally."10 4
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has refused to rest a decision
squarely on the press clause independent from the speech clause, and
it has declined to grant the press any greater protection than ordinary
citizens enjoy under the speech clause. 10 5
The Supreme Court's reluctance to grant the press special First
Amendment privileges not only suggests that the press freedom
envisioned by the First Amendment was merely the freedom of the
people to speak through the press (e.g. newspapers), and the freedom
of the press to speak without government intervention (e.g. prior
restraint), but also that the First Amendment right of access, as
fashioned by the Supreme Court, does little to secure the ability of the
press and public to access the information necessary for the effective
functioning of a republican system of self-government. 10 6
C. Other Possible Constitutional Bases for the Right of Access
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mention the
right of access, there is language elsewhere in the Constitution that is
101. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) ("Mhe First Amendment does
not guarantee the press a constitutional right of access to information not available to the public
generally.").
102. 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing David Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REV. 77, 88-99 (1975)).
103. Id. at 799-800; see Anderson, supra note 69, at 447 n.91 ("[T]he Speech Clause was
intended to protect 'the liberty to express ideas and belief,' while the Press Clause described 'the
freedom to communicate with a large, unforeseen audience."' (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 799,
800 n.5 (Burger, C.J., concurring))).
104. 408 U.S. at 684.
105. Anderson, supra note 69, at 449-50 ("[I]n the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the Court seemed
to lose its enthusiasm for the Press Clause. Whenever possible, it treated media cases as free-
speech cases rather than free-press cases. When confronted with claims that could only be based
on the Press Clause, it rejected them .... ").
106. See discussion infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
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suggestive of a right of access. For example, Article I of the
Constitution mandates that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same."'10 7 Article I also
provides that "a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time."'108 Moreover, Article II provides that the President "shall from
time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the
Union."'1 9 In addition, the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial." 0 These provisions demonstrate that the Framers
were aware that government openness is a value inherent in our
constitutional structure, and that it is essential to the effective
functioning of a democratic government. The explicit textual
recognition of some right of access to government-held information
and proceedings in these provisions lends additional support to the
idea that the First Amendment does not include the right of access
because it shows a conscious decision on the part of the Framers to
exclude the right of access from the ambit of First Amendment
protection.
IV. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AS A SYSTEMIC RIGHT: THE FUNCTIONAL AND
STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS
As discussed in the previous section, efining the right of access
in terms of the First Amendment is unsatisfactory for several reasons.
First, the right of access is not explicitly mentioned in the language of
the First Amendment and there is considerable evidence that access
was not an interest the Framers of the Constitution intended to
protect through the First Amendment."' Second, while the language
of the First Amendment prevents the government from punishing or
censoring speech, it does not require the government to take
affirmative action to remove impediments to speech created by denials
of access to government information. 112
Finally, and most importantly, further expanding the First
Amendment to encompass a right of access does little to actually
ensure press access to government-held proceedings and information
because the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
111. See supra Part III.A.
112. BeVier, supra note 58, at 498; see supra Part III.A.
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Amendment does not give the press any rights above those enjoyed by
ordinary citizens. 113 By grounding the right of access in the First
Amendment but limiting the exercise of that right, the Court assures
the press little in the way of real access to information that the
government seeks to withhold. By relying on a First Amendment
right of access, the press's ability to gather information is limited
because the Supreme Court has held that the press does not have a
special institutional privilege to do whatever it wants. As a result, the
First Amendment is an unsatisfactory basis for the right of access
because it does little to ensure that the public has sufficient
information to participate effectively in the democratic process. A
better approach, one that could offer the press greater protection in
gathering and disseminating information to the public, would be to
recognize the right of access as a systemic right that is inherent in,
and essential to, a fully functioning democracy.
A. The Systemic Nature of the Right of Access
Evidence of the systemic nature of the right of access can be
found in the legislative history of the Constitution. Although it is
unclear how much independent significance the framers of the First
Amendment intended the press clause to have, separate from the
speech clause, it is clear that the Framers considered the freedom of
the press to be a crucial element of a democratic government.11 4
According to Professor David Anderson, "freedom of the press was
viewed not merely as a desirable civil liberty, but as a matter integral
to the structure of the new government.... The demand for legal
protection of the press was contemporaneous with the demand for
independence and self-government."115 Accordingly, since the right of
access is essential to a fully functioning free press, and since a free
press is essential to any system of self-government, it follows that the
right of access is a systemic right that must be an integral part of the
democratic government established by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the right of access can be analogized to other
recognized systemic rights. For example, the Supreme Court has
consistently identified the right to vote as a systemic right that is
inherent in our constitutional structure. 116 In Wesberry v. Sanders,
the Court warned that "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory
113. See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
114. Dyk, supra note 60, at 932.
115. Anderson, supra note 69, at 488.
116. The right to vote in state and federal elections is conferred by the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amends. 14, 15, 17, 19, 23, 24.
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if the right to vote is undermined."' 17 Furthermore, in Illinois Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party the Court stated that "voting is of
the most fundamental significance under our constitutional
structure." 118 As a systemic right, the right to vote is essential to the
effective functioning of our democratic system of government, but this
right cannot be exercised effectively unless citizens are supplied with
enough information to make an informed choice. Justice Brandeis
summarized the importance of information as follows:
In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited time and
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies
necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those
operations. Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report
fully and accurately the proceedings of government, and official records and documents
open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations. Without the
information provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be
unable to vote intelligently .... 119
This quotation demonstrates that the Supreme Court implicitly
recognizes that the right of access and the availability of information
are a fundamental prerequisite to meaningful participation in the
democratic process.
B. The Functional Argument for Recognizing the Right of Access as a
Systemic Right
Perhaps more fundamentally, access and the availability of
information is essential to the proper functioning of the government
because it acts as an additional assurance that elected officials have
access to information on which to base their decisions. True
democratic self-government can only exist when elected leaders are
responsive to the will of the people.120 Yet, for the will of the people to
be legitimate and for the people to function as a rational electorate
they must be adequately informed about the activities of their
government. 121 In addition to promoting effective participation in the
democratic process, access also ensures government accountability,
which is an integral part of any system of government. 122 When
117. 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ('The right to vote
freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.").
118. 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
119. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
120. David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109,
115 (1977).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 116 n.31.
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people do not know what their government is doing, they cannot hold
elected officials accountable for their actions. 123
Likewise, the right of access is an essential threshold to true
democracy because access, and the information it provides, is a
prerequisite for informed speech. Without it citizens will not have
sufficient knowledge to fully participate in the democratic process
because they will be unable to accurately communicate their desires to
the elected representatives that are charged with exercising the will of
their constituents. 124 Access is also a prerequisite to the exercise of
the free speech rights that are necessary for the proper functioning of
the government. 125 Justice Stevens emphasized in Houchins v. KQED,
Inc. that 'the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond specific
guarantees to protect from ... abridgement those equally
fundamental personal rights necessary to make the express
guarantees fully meaningful."' 126 Accordingly, even though the right of
access is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, in many ways
it is essential to the meaningful exercise of fundamental liberties such
as voting and free speech.
C. The Structural Argument for Recognizing the Right of Access as a
Systemic Right
In addition to a functional argument that the right of access is
essential to the functioning of a democratic government, there is also a
structural argument for recognizing the right of access as a systemic
right. The premise underlying the structural argument is that the
123. Id. at 115-16.
124. However, there are some situations where press access could interfere with the effective
functioning of the government. For example, in the case of the Washington, D.C. area sniper,
law enforcement officials complained too much press coverage and press leaks compromised the
investigation. See Gina Lubrano, The Media and the D.C. Sniper Story, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Oct. 28, 2002, at B7 (analyzing the relationship between law enforcement and the
media during the D.C. sniper episode).
125. In the same vein, it can be argued that the basic property rights are a necessary
prerequisite to the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable government searches and
seizures.
126. 438 U.S. 1, 32 n.22 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The entire passage is as follows
Admittedly, the right to receive or acquire information is not specifically mentioned in
the Constitution. But "the protection of the Bill of Rights goes beyond specific
guarantees to protect from.., abridgement those equally fundamental personal
rights necessary to make the express guarantees fully meaningful .... The
dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addresses are not
free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers."
Id. Not only does this idea demonstrate the systemic value of access, it further supports the
argument that the right of access is not included in the First Amendment.
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right of access is implicit in the self-governing structure created by the
Constitution, and "[t]he sovereign people, by virtue of their station as
the fundamental source of all governmental power, have an inherent
right to know what their government is doing."127 The right of access
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but is rather "implicit
in the inalienable power of the people to make and unmake
governments. It is a right that was not expressly forfeited when the
people delegated powers to the government ... [but is] one of those
constitutionally protected unenumerated rights retained by the
people." 128  As an unenumerated right, protection for the right of
access cannot be rooted in the language of the First Amendment;
instead it must flow from its recognition as a systemic right.
The basis for the structural argument for recognizing a
systemic right of access can be found in Alexander Meiklejohn's
political theory. According to Professor Meiklejohn, the central aim of
the First Amendment is to protect the power of the people to
collectively govern themselves. 129 He claimed that "[t]he principle of
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities ... of self-
government," 130 because a citizen must be well informed in order to
make intelligent policy decisions.' 31 Although Meiklejohn did not
expressly address the right of access, his theories lend support to the
idea that access to information is crucial to citizens being able to
"exercise their sovereign will upon government."' 32  According to
Meiklejohn, "all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the
issues which bear upon our common life. That is why no idea, no
opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information
shall be kept from them."' 33  Under Meiklejohn's view, if access to
127. Ivester, supra note 120, at 116.
128. Id.at 116-17. This idea rests on the Ninth Amendment which says, "The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
129. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 27 (1965) ('The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the
program of self-government."), quoted in Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public
Institutions: The First Amendment as Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1981).
130. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 129, at 27, quoted in Lewis, supra note 129, at 3.
131. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 129, at 75 ("The primary purpose of the First Amendment is,
then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our
common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant
information shall be kept from them."); see infra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Lewis,
supra note 129, at 3 (noting that since the "sovereign citizen makes policy[,] ... he must have an
informed basis for his judgment." (citing MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 129, at 34-36)).
132. Cerruti, supra note 7, at 289 (establishing the relevance of Meiklejohn's scholarship to
the right of access).
133. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 129, at 75, quoted in Cerruti, supra note 7, at 289.
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information were restricted, then voters would be deprived of the
knowledge necessary to participate in our representative
democracy. 3 4 Therefore, access to information must be protected to
ensure that every citizen has "the fullest possible participation in the
understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a self-
governing society must deal." 135  According to Meiklejohn, "[s]elf-
government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express . . . ."136Even though principally concerned with the First
Amendment, Meiklejohn's theory supports the idea that the right of
access is a systemic right because it recognizes that access, and the
information it provides, are essential in order for citizens to exercise
their sovereign rights.
In addition to the functional and structural arguments for
recognizing a systemic right of access, further evidence that the right
of access is a systemic right can be found in language in the Supreme
Court's press access cases, and in the legislative history and judicial
treatment of the Freedom of Information Act and other "right to know"
statutes.
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SYSTEMIC RIGHT OF ACCESS
Although the Supreme Court has grounded forty years of right
of access jurisprudence in the First Amendment, certain language in
the Court's opinions demonstrates that the Court acknowledges
openness and the right of access as a systemic right that is inherent in
our democratic system of government. Perhaps the first indication
that the Supreme Court recognized the systemic nature of the right of
access was in 1936 when Justice Southerland concluded that
"informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment."'137 Several years later in New York Times Co. v.
United States Justice Black said that "[tihe press was to serve the
governed, not the governors.... The press was protected so that it
could bare the secrets of government and inform the people."1 38 In the
134. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26-27 (1948), noted in Hayes, supra note 42, at 1113 (making essentially this point).
135. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 134, at 88, quoted in Hayes, supra note 42, at 1113.
136. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
255 (1962), quoted in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 714 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In
this respect, Meiklejohn's political theory is almost a sub-component of the functional rationale
mentioned above.
137. Grosjean v. Am. Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
138. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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same opinion, Justice Douglas argued that "[s]ecrecy in government is
fundamentally anti-democratic .... Open debate and discussion of
public issues [is] vital to our national health."139  A year later in
Branzburg Justice Douglas further argued that "[t]he press has a
preferred position in our constitutional scheme ... to bring fulfillment
to the public's right to know. The right to know is crucial to the
governing powers of the people .... Knowledge is essential to
informed decisions." 140 Justice Powell reiterated this position in Saxbe
v. Washington Post Co., saying that an "informed public depends on
accurate and effective reporting by the news media. No individual can
obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge
of his political responsibilities .... [The press] is the means by which
the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to
intelligent self-government."' 4 1 This idea was again reiterated by
Justice Stevens when he argued that "[o]ur system of self-government
assumes the existence of an informed citizenry .... Without some
protection for the acquisition of information about the operation of
public institutions ... the process of self-governance contemplated by
the Framers would be stripped of its substance."'142
Justice Stewart had long been a champion of an autonomous
press and an advocate for greater press freedoms. He argued that the
press must be unrestrained in its ability to gather news saying,
"[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus
indispensable to a free society."143 Therefore, "[a] corollary of the right
to publish must be the right to gather news."'144 Justice Stewart
thought that the press's ability to gather news was equally as
important as its ability to disseminate that news to the public.145
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court applied
these rationales in the context of ensuring press access to criminal
trials. 146 In the majority opinion, Justice Burger focused on the
tradition of openness in our criminal justice system and, in doing so,
139. Id. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring).
140. 408 U.S. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (paraphrasing Alexander Meiklejohn in the
last sentence of the quoted passage).
141. 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
142. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 727.
145. Id. at 728 ("News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to
acquire information the right to publish will be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right
to gather news ... must exist." (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965))).




noted the value of openness in general stating, "[o]ne of the demands
of a democratic society is that the public should know what goes on in
courts by being told by the press what happens there, to the end that
the public may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and
right."147 Justice Brennan likewise emphasized that "open trials are
bulwarks of our free and democratic government: public access to
court proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks and balances' of our
system, because 'contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on the possible abuse of judicial
power."' 148 Justice Brennan more specifically addressed the right of
access as part of the "assumption that valuable public debate-as well
as other civic behavior-must be informed."'149  Based on this
assumption some constitutional scholars argue that Justice Brennan
supported an expansive affirmative right of access to information on
matters of public concern "regardless of any connection to speech-
based activity."150 This argument serves as additional evidence of the
Supreme Court's willingness to recognize the right of access as a
systemic right rather than a First Amendment right.
VI. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND OTHER "RIGHT TO KNOW"
STATUTES
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)151 is a statutory
example of the functional and structural rationales for recognizing the
right of access as a systemic right. Passed in 1966 in response to
public distrust of the government because of the Vietnam War,1 52 the
FOIA is the primary vehicle for the members of the press, as well as
ordinary citizens, to obtain information about government
147. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 574 n.9 (quoting Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc.
338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
148. Id. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 33 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)); see
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Globe, 457 U.S. at 606.
149. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
150. Cerruti, supra note 7, at 276 (interpreting Justice Brennan's position to be that "[t]he
public .... is affirmatively entitled to access to government-held information on matters of public
debate, regardless of any connection to speech-based activity").
151. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
152. See Robert L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of Freedom of
Information Act Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2000); see also Frank Askin, Secret
Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 777 (1991) ('"The anti-Vietnam
War movement, the Watergate scandal, and the exposure of J. Edgar Hoover's misuse of the FBI
as a political police force helped temporarily to inspire a new spirit of openness in the land that
resulted in, among other things, the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act .... ").
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operations. 153 The FOIA gives all citizens the right to obtain federal
agency records upon request regardless of their reasons for seeking
the information. 154  Even though citizens can easily obtain most
records, under the statute there are nine categories of information an
agency may refuse to release. 155 For the most part, the exceptions are
designed to protect classified government information for purposes of
national security and to prevent disclosure of information that might
impede the proper functioning of the government or invade personal
privacy. 156 Aside from these exemptions, however, the FOIA creates a
presumptive right of access since the government bears the burden of
proof for withholding the requested information. 157
The main purpose of the FOIA is to supply citizens with "the
knowledge necessary to govern."'158 The legislative history of the FOIA
shows that Congress intended to secure public access to government
153. Karen L. Turner, Convergence of the First Amendment and the Withholding of
Information for the Security of the Nation: A Historical Perspective and the Effect of September
11th on Constitutional Freedoms, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 593, 602 (2002). Prior to the passage of
the FOIA, access to agency held government information was controlled by the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), which allowed inspection of pubic records by "persons properly and
directly concerned" with the subject matter of the records, unless the records were kept secret
"for good cause." Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The
"Central Purpose" of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 46 (1994) (quoting
the Administrative Procedure Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, repealed by Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383). Disclosure was minimal under the
APA because the good cause standard became a method for federal agencies to deny even
minimal access. Id.
154. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 6 (1996) ('The FOIA establishes a presumptive right for the
public to obtain identifiable, existing records of Federal departments and agencies ....
Requestors do not have to show a need or reason for seeking information.").
155. Turner, supra note 153, at 602.
156. The records an agency may withhold include:
Information that is classified for national defense or foreign policy purposes;
Information that relates solely to an agency's internal personnel rules and practices;
Information that has been clearly exempted under other laws.
Confidential business information, such as trade secrets;
Internal government deliberative communications about a decision before an
announcement;
Information about an individual that, if disclosed, would cause a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy;
Law enforcement records, particularly of ongoing investigations;
Information concerning bank supervision;
Geological and geophysical information, such as maps.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 6; see 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1)-(b)(9).
157. H.R. REP. NO. 104-795, at 6 ("The burden of proof for withholding requested material
rests with the department or agency that seeks to deny the request.").
158. Cate et al., supra note 153, at 42.
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held information to facilitate the achievement of three goals.159 First,
allowing public access to federal agency records would preserve the
"watchdog function of the public over the government" by ensuring
that government officials continue to act in the public interest.160
Second, the FOIA would ensure access to information regarding public
policy decisions and allow citizens to independently evaluate those
decisions.1 61 Third, the FOIA would prevent the government from
secretly creating or enforcing laws or administrative regulations. 162
Through the achievement of these three goals, the FOIA would foster
openness and increase accountability by exposing the government to,
in the words of the Supreme Court, the "sharp eye of public
scrutiny."163
The passage of the FOIA shows that Congress understands the
importance of openness and the systemic role that the right of access
plays in a democratic system of government. For example, when
President Johnson signed the FOIA into law on July 4, 1966, he said,
"[t]his legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A
democracy works best when the people have all the information that
the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull
curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without
injury to the public interest."1 64 Likewise, the Supreme Court has said
that "[t]he generation that made the nation thought secrecy in
government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny and
committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function
unless the people are permitted to know what their government is up
to." 165  Accordingly, the Court has emphasized that "the Act was
designed to create a broad right of access to 'official information"'1 66
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The rationale underlying the second goal of the FOIA is that since "[c]itizens enjoy the
benefits or suffer the consequences of public policy .... they should be able to draw their own
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of that policy" Id. (quoting Glenn Dickinson, Comment,
The Supreme Court's Narrow Reading of Public the Public Interest Served by the Freedom of
Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 197 (1990)); see S. REP NO. 89-813 (1965); H.R. REP. No.
89-1497 (1966).
162. Cate et al., supra note 153, at 43.
163. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 774 (1989), quoted in Cate et al., supra note 153, at 43.
164. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 8 (1996) (quoting PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, (1966)).
165. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry Steele
Commager, N.Y. REV., Oct. 5, 1972, at 7). Likewise, Justice Douglas has argued that "[s]ecrecy is
government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors." N.Y. Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 724 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
166. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772 (quoting Mink, 410 U.S. at 80).
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and that "[tihe basic policy of 'full agency disclosure unless
information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,'
indeed focuses on the citizens' right to be informed. . . ."167 These
statements by the Supreme Court regarding the purpose of the FOIA,
in addition to the four goals of the FOIA identified by Congress,
indicate that both institutions recognize the importance of the right of
access to the proper functioning of a democracy and that the passage
of FOIA was necessary to fully secure this right. Similarly, if the
FOIA is a Congressional acknowledgment that the right of access is a
systemic right that is integral to a fully functioning democracy, then
the FOIA can also be seen as additional evidence that the First
Amendment is not the source of the right of access. Since the
language of the First Amendment does not explicitly guarantee the
right of access, Congress, recognizing the public mistrust created
when the government operates behind closed doors, took steps to
ensure access to government information though passage of the
Freedom of Information Act. 168
Similarly, in addition to indicating that the Supreme Court
recognizes the systemic nature of the of the right of access, the
language in the Supreme Court's FOIA cases also lends support to the
argument that the right of access is not included in the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech or the press. Chief
Justice Burger articulated this idea when he quoted Justice Stewart's
comment that "[t]here is no constitutional right to have access to
particular government information .... The Constitution itself is [not]
a Freedom of Information Act."'169 This language suggests that the
Supreme Court may be backing away from its previous position that
the right of access is grounded in the First Amendment. 170
In addition to the FOIA, the Sunshine Act is another concrete
statutory example of the functional and structural rationales for
recognizing the right of access as a systemic right. The Government
in the Sunshine Act requires that meetings of government agencies be
open to the public. 171 The legislative history of the statute shows that
ensuring press and public access to information regarding the
activities of the federal government was Congress's primary concern
167. Id. at 773 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965), quoted in Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S.
352, 360-61 (1976)).
168. See Saloschin, supra note 152, at 1401 (attributing the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act in part to public distrust of government).
169. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (quoting Stewart, supra note 76, at 636
(emphasis added)).
170. See discussion supra Part II and accompanying footnotes.
171. 5 U.S.C. §552b(b) (2000).
20041 1377
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
in passing this legislation. 172 The impetus for the Act was the fear
that government had become too "secretive and remote from the
people," and that by forcing the government to open its doors, there
would be an increase in public participation in the government,
"greater accountability of public officials to the public, a concomitant
increase in the degree to which government policy reflects the
interests of the public at large, and a renewed public faith in
government."'173 These goals support the idea that the right of access
is a systemic right that is inherent in, and essential to, the functioning
of a democratic government and that Congress itself recognizes the
systemic value of the right of access and government openness.
VII. MODERN RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ACCESS
Just as there is no real textual basis for the right of access in
the Constitution, the only constitutional reference to the government's
ability to withhold information is found in the Article I language
giving Congress the authority to withhold information from its public
records it considers necessary to keep secret. 174 While there is no
general government power to withhold information, 175 the FOIA
explicitly permits restricting press and public access to information
relating to matters of national security, and the Supreme Court has
held that there are some situations in which the government could
restrain the press's ability to publish in order to protect matters of
national security. 76  Accordingly, even if the right of access is
172. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241, 1241 (1976) ("It
is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that the public is entitled to the fullest
practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the Federal Government.").
173. Thomas H. Tucker, "Sunshine" - The Dubious New God, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 537, 537
(1980) (citing S. REP. No. 94-354, at 1, 4-9 (1975)).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require
Secrecy .. "); see Ivester, supra note 120, at 145 ('The only time secrecy is mentioned in the
Constitution is with regard to the right of the houses of Congress to delete certain information
from their published journals. Nowhere is a general power to withhold information expressly
authorized."). Presumably, information Congress would want to keep secret would be
information that could affect national security.
175. General power is thought to refer to broad powers of wide application, such as the power
to regulate commerce. The power to Congress to withhold information is narrow in that it is
limited to removal of information from Congressional journals. Ivester, supra note 120, at 145
n.163.
176. 5 U.S.C. §552b(1); see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single, extremely
narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior judicial restraint may be
overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise only when the Nation 'is
at war,' .. " (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919))). Lower courts have also
supported the government's ability to prevent the press from publishing information detrimental
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recognized as a systemic, fundamental right, it can be limited when
the security of the nation is at issue.
This principle has come into play most recently in the wake of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C. One area of government in which the right of access
has been jeopardized is the judicial system. The homeland security
measures recently enacted by the Bush Administration have
undermined the principle of open trials espoused in Richmond
Newspapers in two ways. 177 First, Attorney General John Ashcroft
issued an order to all immigration judges to close their courtrooms, 178
and second, President Bush issued an executive order establishing
secret military tribunals. 179
The order directing Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) administrative judges and court administrators to close their
courtrooms, otherwise known as the Creppy Memorandum because it
was issued in the from of a memorandum from Chief Immigration
Judge Michael Creppy, states that special procedures should be
implemented for certain cases requiring the judges "to hold the
hearings individually, to close the hearing to the public, and to avoid
discussing the case or otherwise disclosing any information about the
case to anyone outside the Immigration Court.' ' 80  The Creppy
Memorandum further specifies that "no visitors, no family, and no
press" were allowed in the courtroom,18' and that no record of any
proceeding could be disclosed except to the deportee's attorney,
to national security. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir. 1972)
(enjoining disclosure by certain CIA secrets in accordance with a secrecy agreement); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 999-1000 (D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of
information regarding the workings of the hydrogen bomb).
177. Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L.
& POL-Y 461, 463 (2002). Olson quotes legal scholar Vincent Blasi, who coined the term
"pathological perspective." Id. at 462. Blasi believed that "[i]n most periods, the central norms of
a constitutional tradition are not challenged," but in times of national stress, "[t]he core
commitments that derive from those norms are viewed by many as highly burdensome and
controversial .... In times when those misgivings take hold, the central norms of the
Constitutional regime are in jeopardy." Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 456-57 (1985).
178. Olson, supra note 177, at 463 (citing Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief
Immigration Judge of the United States, to Immigration Judges and Court Administrators 1
(Sept. 21, 2001), [hereinafter Creppy Memorandum], http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu
/creppy092 l01memo.pdf).
179. Id. at 463-64 (citing Press Release, The White House, President Issues Military Order
(Nov. 12, 2001), [hereinafter White House Press Release], http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsl
releases/2001/11/print/20011113-27.html).
180. Creppy Memorandum, supra note 178, at 1, quoted in Olson, supra note 177, at 465.
181.Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added), quoted in Olson, supra note 177, at 465.
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"assuming the file does not contain classified information."''1 2 The
memorandum directed Immigration judges to withhold additional
information saying, "[t]his restriction on information includes
confirming or denying whether such a case is on the docket or
scheduled for a hearing."18 3
The press challenged the Creppy Memorandum in two lawsuits
filed against Attorney General Ashcroft demanding access to the
closed immigration proceedings.18 4 The first case, Detroit Free Press
Association v. Ashcroft, stemmed from the special interest case of
Rabih Haddad, who was facing deportation for overstaying his travel
visa and whom the government believed to be operating a charity that
supplied money to terrorist groups.18 5 When members of Haddad's
family, the press, the public, and a United States Congressman sought
to attend his deportation hearing, security guards denied them access
to the courtroom and informed them that the hearing was closed to
the press and the public. 8 6 Haddad and several newspapers filed suit
claiming that the dictates of the Creppy Memorandum as applied in
their case violated their right of access. 8 7
The Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond Newspapers' two-part
"experience and logic" test and held that the press and public have a
right of access to attend deportation hearings 88 In its opinion, the
court warned, "[d]emocracies die behind closed doors.... When
government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information
rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is
misinformation."'18 9 The Sixth Circuit also gave several reasons why
the right of access played a "significant positive role"' 90 in deportation
hearings. It first noted that "public access acts as a check on the
actions of the Executive by assuring us that proceedings are conducted
fairly and properly."' 9' Second, the Sixth Circuit noted that "openness
182. Id. at 2, quoted in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2002).
183. Id. at 2, quoted in Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684.
184. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit
Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683.
185. 303 F.3d at 684.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 700-05. While Richmond Newspapers established a right of access to criminal
trials, the Supreme Court has yet to extend the right of access to civil trials. Furthermore,
deportation hearings are not really trials at all, but administrative hearings conducted by the
executive branch. However, the Sixth Circuit found that these hearings "exhibit substantial
quasi-judicial characteristics." Id. at 694, quoted in Adam Liptak, In Tense Times, a Court
Insists on Open Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at D3.
189. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683.
190. Id. at 703 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986)).
191. Id. at 703-04 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)).
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ensures that government does its job properly; that it does not make
mistakes." 192 Third, open deportations "serve a 'therapeutic' purpose
as outlets for 'community concern, hostility, and emotions.' 193 Fourth,
"openness enhances the perception of integrity and fairness."194 And
finally, "public access helps ensure that 'the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of
self-government."' 195
Although the Sixth Circuit discussed the benefits of the right of
access in the context of deportation hearings, these benefits have a
broader application to the functioning of the government as a whole.
This opinion is a recent example of the movement of courts toward
recognizing the right of access as a systemic right that is inherent in a
democratic government. Also, this opinion is a recent example of
courts' invocation of that systemic right to secure access to
government information that would otherwise be excluded under the
traditional First Amendment access doctrine.
In addition to the Sixth Circuit case challenging the
constitutionality of the Creppy Memorandum and seeking access to
special interest deportation hearings, the Third Circuit addressed the
same issue in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft.196 Like the
Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit applied the Richmond Newspapers'
experience and logic test.1 97 However, this court concluded that the
tradition of openness of deportation proceedings did not meet that
standard.1 98 Furthermore, even though the Third Circuit agreed with
the Sixth Circuit that allowing the press and the public access to
deportation hearings would serve important functions, the court
nonetheless held that openness did not play a significant positive role
in the proceeding.1 99 In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit
examined "the flip side-the extent to which openness impairs the
public good" and focused on evidence that opening the special interest
deportation hearings would create serious national security
concerns.
200
192. Id. at 704.
193. Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571).
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)).
196. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
197. Id. at 201.
198 Id.
199. Id. at 220.
200. Id. at 217-19. The Third Circuit outlined the potential dangers of open hearings:
[Plublic hearings would.., reveal sources and methods of investigation ... [which
allow] "a terrorist organization to build a picture of the investigation....
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Finally, although the Third Circuit held there was no right of
access to attend special interest deportation hearings, it emphasized
the narrowness of its holding, stating,
[w]e do not decide that there is no right to attend administrative proceedings, or even
that there is no right to attend any immigration proceeding. Our judgment is confined to
the extremely narrow class of deportation cases that are determined by the Attorney
General to present significant national security concerns."
2 0 1
The North Jersey Media Group case illustrates the principle that the
right of access is not absolute and national security concerns can
override the press's and public's right to know what their government
is "up to"; however, since there is now a split of authority between the
Third and Sixth Circuits, the Supreme Court may well be called upon
to establish more precisely the limits of the right of access.
In addition to the Creppy Memorandum, President Bush issued
an order authorizing secret military tribunals. These tribunals were
established to try non-United States citizens suspected of being
members of terrorist organizations, specifically Al-Qaeda, or of having
"engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore. '20 2 The order
further stated that "[g]iven the danger to the safety of the United
States and the nature of international terrorism,... it is not
practicable to apply the principles of law ... generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts. '20 3
Although several groups such as the American Bar Association and
the American Civil Liberties Union raised concerns that fundamental
liberties would be impaired through the tribunals, President Bush
defended the order on national security grounds. 20 4
... [I]nformation about how any given individual entered the country... would allow
the terrorist organization to see patterns of entry, what works and what doesn't ....
... [I]nformation about what evidence the United States has against members of a
particular cell collectively will inform the terrorist organization as to what cells to use
and which not to use for further plots and attacks ...."
•.. [I]f a terrorist organization discovers that a particular member is detained, or that
information about a plot is known, it may accelerate the timing of a planned attack,
thus reducing the amount of time the government has to detect and prevent it ....
... [And finally,] a public hearing involving evidence about terrorist links could allow
terrorist organizations to interfere with the pending proceedings by creating false or
misleading evidence.
Id. at 218 (quoting in part the declaration of Dale Watson, the FBI's Executive Assistant Director
for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence).
201. Id. at 220.
202. White House Press Release, supra note 179, quoted in Olson, supra note 177, at 467.
203. Id., quoted in Olson, supra note 177, at 467.
204. Olson, supra note 177, at 467-68; see White House Press Release, supra note 179 ("I
have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for national defense purposes.... and
that issuance of this order is necessary to meet the emergency.").
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In addition to the above-mentioned limitations, following the
September 11, 2001 attacks the press's ability to gather news was
further restricted. For example, for almost three months following the
attack, the press was prohibited from entering the site of the World
Trade Center. 20 5  In fact, there were reported instances of police
confiscating cameras and film, in addition to threatening reporters
with citations, or actually citing them, for entering the restricted
area.206 During this time, reporters were also forbidden to report from
Afghanistan, according to the Department of Defense, because of the
need for secrecy in the military operations taking place there. 20 7 In
addition, government agencies blocked access to maps and satellite
images of Afghanistan as well as to information regarding national
water supplies, energy facilities, nuclear plants, and chemical plants
because it was considered a threat to national security. 208
Furthermore, following September 11, 2001 there was an increase in
the number of denials under the FOIA because of a decision by
Attorney General Ashcroft to rescind a government-wide directive that
mandated the limited use of FOIA exemptions. 20 9 Attorney General
Ashcroft promised that the Department of Justice would defend any
government agency's denial of a FOIA request.210 Ashcroft went on to
establish a new policy allowing agencies to withhold information as
long as they have a "sound legal basis" for doing so. 211
Surprisingly, several of the restrictions placed on the press
after September 11, 2001, were not imposed by a government order,
but were instead voluntarily adopted by the press.21 2 For example, at
the request of the White House, executives from the three major
networks, in addition to Fox News and CNN, agreed not to air
"unedited, videotaped statements from Osama Bin Laden and his
followers ... [and also] agreed to remove from the taped statements
205. Turner, supra note 153, at 608.
206. Id. at 607 (citing Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Sporadic Press
Restrictions Seen in the Aftermath of Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 19, 2001). Arguably, however,
these restrictions were imposed so that extensive press coverage did not hamper the recovery
efforts, as well as for the safety of the reporters themselves.
207. See id. at 607-08.
208. Id. at 609. Agencies also removed information from their websites. For example, the
National Nuclear Security Administration removed the Department of Energy's Office of Defense
Programs page from its website. Id.
209. Id. at 610.
210. Id. (quoting Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Ashcroft Promises for FOI
Act Denials (Oct. 18, 2001).
211. Ted Bridis, Bush Backs Changes in Hacking Disclosure, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at
A27; see Turner, supra note 153, at 610 (quoting Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
Ashcroft Promises for FOI Act Denials (Oct. 18, 2001).
212. See Turner, supra note 153, at 608.
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'language the government consider[ed] inflammatory.' 213  In effect,
these restrictions made it very difficult for the press to gather news on
the "War on Terror" and as a result made it nearly impossible for
citizens to know about the decisions their government was making. 214
The government seeks to justify the restrictions on press
activity enacted after September 11, 2001 under the traditional First
Amendment jurisprudence that allows restrictions on the availability
of information in order to protect national security. Even though some
restrictions are necessary if essential to prevent "direct, immediate,
and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,"21 5 the restrictions
enacted by the Bush administration in the name of national security
are often grossly overreaching and must be more narrowly tailored to
preserve the systemic value of the right of access. The values of
government openness and accountability that are secured through a
systemic right of access are the type of fundamentally democratic
ideals that the War on Terror is being fought to protect; and therefore
the modern restrictions on the free flow of information to the public
are logically inconsistent with the systemic right of access that
emphasizes the necessity of access in preserving a functioning
democracy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, although the Supreme Court has grounded forty years
of right-of-access jurisprudence in the First Amendment, it is an
unsatisfactory basis for the right of access because the right of access
goes beyond the scope of traditional First Amendment values and
because the First Amendment does not provide access to the amount
of information necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our
democratic government. In addition, not only is there no explicit
textual reference to the right of access in the First Amendment, the
guarantees of freedom of speech and of press were only intended to
protect against government interference through censorship or prior
restraint, not to grant the press any affirmative rights. Furthermore,
basing the right of access in the First Amendment does little to
actually ensure press access to government held proceedings and
information because the Supreme Court has held that the First
213. Id. (quoting The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, White House Urges TV
Networks to Stop Airing Bin Laden Tapes, Oct. 11, 2001, http://www.rcfp.org/news
/2001/101 imajorb.html).
214. See id. at 613.
215. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Amendment does not give the press any rights above those enjoyed by
ordinary citizens. 216
A better approach, and one that could provide greater
protection for the ability of the press to gather and disseminate
information to the public, would be to recognize the right of access as a
systemic right that is inherent in, and essential to, our democratic
government. Access is a systemic right that is essential to the proper
functioning of the government because access, and the information it
provides, ensures that the people can effectively exercise their right to
vote by making informed decisions, that the people have the
knowledge necessary to inform the elected representatives charged
with exercising the will of their constituents, and that those elected
officials remain accountable to the people.
Support for a systemic right of access can be found in several
sources. Supreme Court opinions demonstrate that the Court
recognizes openness and the right of access as a systemic right that is
inherent in our democratic system of government. Additional
evidence that the right of access is a systemic right can be found in the
passage of "right to know" statutes such as the Freedom of
Information Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act, which are
the primary vehicles for the members of the press, as well as ordinary
citizens, to obtain information about government operations.
Furthermore, the legislative history and judicial treatment of these
statutes shows that the government understands the importance of
openness and the systemic role that the right of access plays in the
proper functioning of the government. These statutes also
demonstrate that Congress realizes the right of access is not included
in the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech or the press;
and, therefore, Congress chose to ensure access legislatively though
these "right to know" statutes.
Finally, the recent restrictions on the right of access
implemented by the federal government following the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks suggest that even if the right of access is
recognized as a systemic right, it can be limited when the security of
the nation is at stake. Judicial language in recent cases considering
the validity of some of these restrictions shows that courts may be
moving toward explicitly recognizing the right of access as a systemic
right that is inherent in, and essential to, a democratic government. 217
For example, the Sixth Circuit's admonition in Detroit Free Press
216. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring)
("I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to disseminate ideas by way of a
newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches ....").
217. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
20041 1385
1386 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:4:1349
Association that "[d]emocracies die behind closed doors ''218 suggests
that limitations on the right of access should be narrowly tailored to
preserve the democratic ideals on which this Nation was founded.
Amy Jordan*
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